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REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Anheuser-Busch misstates the facts surrounding its service of alcohol to 
plaintiff Michael Bee at its Bud World Party and its conduct in bringing him onto an ice 
rink without a helmet or other protective gear, to participate in a hockey-puck shooting 
contest. Mr. Bee fell and suffered serious brain, head, and neck injuries. 
For example, Anheuser Busch states, "Plaintiff admitted that he had 
consumed all but six (6) ounces of alcohol before even going to Bud World. (R. 245-46.)" 
Anheuser-Busch also cites R. 245-46 for its allegation that "Plaintiff ignored instruction 
to stand still and 'putt' the puck", and "[ijnstead, he took off down the ice and fell on his 
head while taking a slap shot. (R. 245-46)." These are contrived and totally false 
statements. See R. 245-46. 
R 245-46 contains the "Statement of Relevant Facts" of Anheuser-Busch's 
memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment to dismiss plaintiff's punitive 
damages claim. Rather than state what Anheuser-Busch has represented, Anheuser 
Busch's "Statement of Relevant Facts" states as follows: 
3. Plaintiff continued to drink three to four 22-oz. cups of beer 
while at the Bud World exhibit and claims he was drunk 
throughout his visit at the event.. . . 
6. Plaintiff was invited to participate in a contest to shoot a hockey 
puck towards a goal by event personnel and Plaintiff agreed to 
participate.... 
7. Plaintiff slipped on the ice while swinging to shoot the puck, 
lost his balance, and fell, cutting the back of his head. . . . 
R. 245-46. 
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Anheuser-Busch's actual statements in the record comport more with the 
court's findings in ruling on Anheuser-Busch's motion for summary judgment on 
plaintiffs claim for punitive damages. Denying the motion for summary judgment, the 
court, Judge Roth presiding, found as follows: 
1. AB supplied Plaintiff with approximately 90 oz. of alcohol on top of 
what he had consumed before his arrival at the Bud World Party. 
2. AB had arranged the Bud World Party to promote its product and sell 
it. 
3. AB had a higher reason to believe that people participating at the Bud 
World Party would have been drinking, by the atmosphere and 
intention AB had there. 
4. AB arranged the ice rink contest in the context of a drinking place, 
where drinking was being promoted. 
5. Plaintiff was drunk or considerably intoxicated at the time, he had a 
beer in hand, he had been reaching for a puck on the ice and 
interacting with people running the contest. 
6. AB had reason to know Plaintiff had been drinking and was drunk 
and had been acting rowdy. 
7. Plaintiff did not do anything in particular to cause the accident other 
than what was expected of him, including to raise a hockey stick and 
hit a puck. 
8. AB knew others were falling on the ice and that Plaintiff was 
unsteady, but took no precautions to give Plaintiff a steady surface to 
stand on or protective gear. 
9. Children participating in ice contests were put on carpet and given 
helmets. 
10. AB knew or should have known that there was a high probability of 
harm or danger to Plaintiff in the circumstances. 




THE TRIAL COURT'S PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN VOIR DIRE 
WAS PRESERVED FOR APPEAL 
Anheuser-Busch attempts to distinguish this court's recent decision in 
Alcazar v. University of Utah, 2008 UT App. 222, by arguing that plaintiff in the case at 
bar did not preserve the trial court's failure to give voir dire to prospective jurors on tort 
reform and negligence issues. The court in Alcazar reaffirmed its longstanding holding 
that trial courts are obligated to elicit disclosure from prospective jurors during voir dire 
about their exposure to tort reform propaganda and to negative reports about negligence 
cases, as well as to inquire as to juror prejudices against negligence cases. Id. at ff 11-
14, 19. See, Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96, 102-104 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), Evans v. 
Doty, 824 P.2d 460, 462, 467 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). 
Following Barrett and Evans, Alcazar held that plaintiffs in negligence cases are entitled 
to such voir dire, "first, 'to allow counsel to uncover biases of individual jurors sufficient 
to support a for-cause challenge' and second, 'to gather information enabling counsel to 
intelligently use peremptory challenges.'" Alcazar at f 10. Plaintiff's requested voir 
dire that was rejected by the trial court in the matter at bar was nearly identical to voir dire 
approved by the court in Alcazar and its predecessors. Alcazar at f f 4, 14, Addendum 1. 
The Utah Supreme Court set forth the rule governing preservation of an 
issue for appeal, as follows: 
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Generally, "in order to preserve an issue for appeal the issue must be 
presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an 
opportunity to rule on that issue." We have set forth three factors that 
help determine whether the trial court had such an opportunity: "(1) the 
issue must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be 
specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce supporting evidence 
or relevant legal authority. In short, a party may not claim to have 
preserved an issue for appeal by "merely mentioning . . . an issue 
without introducing supporting evidence or relevant legal authority." 
Ultimately, the preservation requirement "is based on the premise that 
in the interest of orderly procedure, the trial court ought to be given an 
opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it." 
Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, f 15, (footnotes omitted). 
The record in the case at bar reveals that all three factors outlined by the 
supreme court were met to preserve the issue of whether the trial court erred in not giving 
voir dire on exposure to tort reform propaganda and negative reports of negligence cases, 
as well as prejudice against negligence cases. First, the issue was raised in a timely 
fashion, since it was raised before voir dire, when the court first addressed defendants' 
objections to plaintiffs requested voir dire. R. 2226, 1:6-3:1. Second, the issue was 
specifically raised. Plaintiff had submitted his requested voir dire well before the start of 
trial to the court and defendants. RR. 1740-44. When the court addressed plaintiffs 
requested voir dire on tort reform and negligence case prejudice, defendants objected and 
argued that the questions were designed to "inflame" prospective jurors and were a waste 
of time. R. 2226, 1:6-3:1. Plaintiff responded by explaining, in detail, why the questions 
were proper and mandatory. Id. Thus, the issue was specifically raised. 
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Third, plaintiff provided relevant, and, indeed, controlling legal authority to 
the court. R. 1741, R. 2226, 1:6-3:1. Plaintiff gave the court full citations to the Ostler, 
Evans, and Barrett decisions in support of the requested voir dire questions, and then 
referenced the controlling Utah appellate court decisions while countering defendants' 
arguments. Id. The court then ruled that it would not give plaintiff's requested voir dire, 
but would ask one question to cover, to the court's satisfaction, plaintiff's voir dire 
questions nos. 1 through 4. R. 2226, 1:6-3:1. All of this is clear from the following 
dialogue: 
THE COURT: Okay. We'll go on the record with 
case number 020910483. We're no[w] discussing the potential voir 
dire questions and objections. And two, we're addressing the plaintiffs. 
All right. You've objected to the questions one through four, and the 
reasons were for the record, counsel? 
MR. DALTON: The reasons were that these type of 
questions generate - are just intended to generate inflammatory 
responses, Your Honor. I had this same experience just in my last trial 
where they used these same questions. All the jurors don't like 
lawsuits. They don't like high verdicts. When these questions were 
last - asked at the last trial that I got at, we spent an inordinate amount 
of time bringing people in that said, oh, the McDonald's case, or the 
BMW case. And I think a reasonable question is, do you have a 
problem with resolving disputes through lawsuits is okay. But when 
you start trying to bait people to get, you know, the conservatives who 
don't like big verdicts, then you're just going to get all kinds of 
responses, and it's intended to just - to try to inflame people. 
MR. RAT Y: Your Honor, these are taken right out of the 
case law. Our appellate courts have recognized we live in a tort reform 
society. The plaintiffs have an absolute right to know the exposure of 
these potential jurors to the propaganda that's generated by these big 
companies and insurance companies on these issues. And, you know, 
-5-
i UHM , .can; :i.cdiLii }MH ami sa\. vou know, that would be 
prejudicial error not to give these, Bui they arc right out o\ the case 
law. Your Honor, and thiVre \er\ lair questions. | W)e have a need 
ami a right to know \i we've got tort reformers on this jur\ We have 
the right to intelligently exercise our peremptory challenges, and we 
can't do that if wc don't know what their opinions are. We don't know 
what they' ve been exposed to. These are all legitimate questions. I've 
a!w ;JY<- had these given in my p;^1 n-i-.k
 ;UM\ tlv-\ Yr yen appropriate. 
llil COl R i I max reduce them down. I don't 
know av I'm going to go into the detai! 1 think more of a general flavor 
of some of these questions w ould be fine. I .ike - and like for example, 
question three. Do ym personal!} believe that jury verdicts are 
unreasonable'/ Well, (hat s so broad, at least to me. VVK; ^ n.rv 
verdict? Mow a^u h s^uk-yr- } v ^ k n o v ! -i^.L -
Ml SUNSLN. JLHW ^v^uii wan era!i one 
question and -
THE COURT: Yeah. 
R. 2226, 1:6-3:1. • 
1 lie » uuii II r. r \preyed "i«s imwillini'ue^. lu ask plaintiff s requested voir 
dire, which, it apparently found too detailed and too broad. This, in spite of plaintiff's 
citation and reference to controlling case law and plaintiff's warning of prejudicial error. 
The trial court appeared to have a snnilai aliunde inwaid ilic i ase lav r. llie li al « ' I in 
A h <; u • « ».- '^i . . -M ul counsel for Anheuser-Busch, the court 
decided that instead of giving plaintiff's requested voir dire, it would cover matters with 
one question of its own, 
biiuvii , „ • . . . . . ^K a i xr. lire to and 
biasvs I ruin - - *,.•»< erntive reports of personal iniurx ca^es, was 
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"presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court ha[d] an opportunity to rule 
on that issue." Pratt f 15. The issue was preserved for appeal. 
Nevertheless, Anheuser-Busch argues, as did defendant in Alcazar, that the 
trial court did not so much reject plaintiffs voir dire, as it decided to ask plaintiffs 
questions in a different way. See Alcazar <f 5 and defendant's brief pp. 13-14. Anheuser-
Busch argues that the voir dire asked by the trial court was sufficient to satisfy Utah 
appellate court case requirements. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has stated that a trial court does not necessarily 
have to accept the plaintiffs formulation of tort reform and negligence voir dire 
questions, but if it rejects plaintiffs formulation, it is obligated to craft and ask questions 
sufficient to reveal whether prospective jurors have been exposed to tort reform 
propaganda and negative reports of negligence cases. Alcazar at f 14, Barrett at 101. 
The trial court must then be prepared to follow up any positive responses with more 
specific questions designed to probe prospective jurors' attitudes and possible biases 
against negligence cases. Id. As the court said in Barrett, 
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court should have asked the 
prospective jurors appropriate preliminary questions-either those 
suggested by appellant or alternative questions more to its liking 
-designed to detect, initially, whether any of the propective jurors had 
been exposed to tort reform and medical negligence propaganda. Had 
the trial court done so, and had any of the jurors responded positively 
to these initial questions, appellant would have been entitled to have 
more specific questions put to the jurors designed to probe those 
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jm^y's attitudes regarding, and possible bias resulting from, the tort • 
reform information. 
Barrett u. iL-:. ^emphasis added). 
Anhueser-Busch sets forth three voir dire questions USKO . • •• i 
whicl 1 it claims vv ei e si lfficiei it to i i leet the reqi lirei nents of I Jtal 1 a • • Me • ase law. 
i \, •, ; -•.-•- .• *t i, / jurors, family, or friends had previously made a personal 
injury claim, whether they felt that any such claim was not properly resolved, and whether 
prospective jurors believed thcyeouiii i^  ;<th aiui iniru, . , . . ..n. . *»M * exiiil.iiif s 
buc. , . .... i.. • . * •'..• questions 
a4 \ ..-, *• it ten, and Evans were held by the court to be inadequate. . Mcaza* at 
f 5, i:'\Y//Ls at 46~\ Barren at i These questions do not reveal prospective juror 
exposure to tort reform propaganda and to negative repc * i.. U^HI:UM , • /. 
1 ncM
 i : \ alone subtle, biases 
agau • a personal iniurv cases, iu. Ako, die court ui appeals has made clear th.it ''broad 
questions concerning the prospective jurors' self-assessed ability to be fair au impartial" 
do not suffice. Barrett iv 
In fuel Hie v mi 4 In r »l llir trial courts in Alcazar, Barrett, and Evans, while 
held to be inadequate, was actually more extensiu thai: \\K \oir dire performed by the 
h'.y >.-.r,\ h-- the case at bar. Alcazai at'j[T H 18, £Y<7/?.v at 4(>_ -+<>.-. ,>.«\a/;... 
exampk, m Alcazar, the voir dire lasu.. ,;j j ; • • 
inter < - iews ; * itli eighteen men ibers of the \ renire panel. The trial court even asked 
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whether prospective jurors, close friends, or relatives were in favor or opposed to tort 
reform. Alcazar at 114, 18. However, when a panel member asked, "What's tort 
reform" the trial court cut-off any further discussion. Id. The court of appeals noted that 
the trial court's approach did not, therefore, aid plaintiff's understanding of prospective 
juror exposure to tort reform and medical negligence material. Id. 
As inadequate as the voir dire was in Alcazar, it was more-so in the case at 
bar. The court's total voir dire was less than one and one-half hours and included no 
private interviews to follow up on responses made by the venire panel in court. Of 
course, there was no mention about tort reform or whether the panel had watched, read, or 
heard anything about personal injury cases, nor the other appropriate topics raised by 
plaintiff's rejected voir dire. R. 2223 3:9-44:16, Addendum 1. 
Anheuser-Busch asserts that the trial court had broad discretion over what 
voir dir to give. That, however, is not the case on the voir dire at issue: 
"We review challenges to the trial court's management of jury voir dire 
under an abuse of discretion standard. Generally, the trial court is 
afforded broad discretion in conducting voir dire, 'but that discretion 
must be exercisedin favor ofallowing discovery of biases or prejudice 
in prospective jurors." Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96, 98 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993) (quoting State v. Hall, 797 P.2d 470, 472 (Utah Ct. App.), 
cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990)) (other citations omitted). 
Due to the strong interest in enabling parties "to elicit necessary 
information for ferreting out bias," State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59,<p4, 
992 P.2d 951, a trial court's discretion is most broad when it is 
exercised with respect to questions that have no apparent link to any 
potential bias. However, the trial judge's discretion narrows to the 
extent that questions do have some possible link to possible biasy and 
when proposed voir dire questions go directly to the existence of an 
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actual bias, that discretion disappears. The trial court must allow 
such inquiries. Id. at ^43. 
Depew v. Sullivan 2003 UT App. 152, 71 p. 3d 601, a t f l 11, 12. (emphasis added). 
Anheuser-Busch also incorrectly argues that "[p]laintiff made clear in his 
proposed voir dire questions that his voluminous tort reform and excess verdict questions 
had to be asked in chambers." Anheuser-Busch's brief p. 11. First, the questions were 
not voluminous, but fit on a single page. See Addendum 1. Second, following the 
procedure recommended by the court of appeals, plaintiffs voir dire included threshold 
question to be asked in court and follow-up questions to be asked in chambers if a 
concerning response were given to the threshold questions. The questions were designed 
to identify potential prejudice of any prospective juror while preventing such prejudice 
from being communicated to the whole panel by inviting such a juror to express his 
opinions in chambers. Again, the questions were either taken from or were approved by 
the Evans, Barrett, and Alcazar cases. The trial court had the right, and, having 
rejected plaintiffs formulation of voir dire questions, clearly had the obligation to 
properly inquire into prospective juror exposure to tort reform propaganda and negative 
reports about negligence cases, and then follow up on the responses. The trial court failed 
to fulfill its obligation. The court also would not permit the attorneys to ask any of their 
own voir dire questions. R. 2223, 6:24-71. 
Nevertheless, Anheuser-Busch repeatedly argues that the court "repeatedly" 
gave plaintiff the opportunity to reassert its rejected voir dire questions and to assert 
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additional objections to the court's voir dire, but plaintiff failed to do so. See Anheuser-
Busch' s brief pp. 3, 5, 11-18. Defendant cites just two places in the record in support of 
this contention of repeated opportunities, and manufactures its argument out of the fact 
that the court turned off the record when it called counsel to side bar after completing its 
voir dire. After the court asked all the questions it had, it stated: 
THE COURT: Thank you. Did counsel have any additional 
questions they'd like the Court to consider? If so, let's approach the 
bench if you would. Ladies and gentlemen, what we're doing is 
counsel is going to come up here and give me some suggestions of some 
additional questions that they would like me to consider to ask you. 
We're going to go off the record and Fm going to turn off the record 
for a moment. If you'll just be patient with us for a moment. 
(Whereupon a sidebar was held - inaudible) 
R. 2223,40:7-16. 
Based on the above statement, Anheuser-Busch argues that plaintiff had the 
opportunity to object again, and that he should have objected again and reasserted his tort 
reform and negligence voir dire, but that plaintiff was "silent". This argument has no 
merit. First, plaintiff appears "silent" because the court had turned off the record. 
Second, the court asked for "any additional questions [counsel] would like the court to 
consider." As the court had already rejected plaintiff's voir dire, plaintiff did not have 
additional questions for the court to consider. As set forth above, under Pratt, the issue 
of the court's error in rejecting plaintiff's voir dire on tort reform and negligence case 
prejudice was preserved for appeal on the record. Anheuser-Busch's request that the 
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court discard that and, instead, assume that plaintiff did not object again while the record 
was turned off, should be rejected. 
As Anheuser-Busch has attempted to take advantage of the record being 
off, to represent to the court of appeals that plaintiff did not object again or reassert his 
rejected voir dire, plaintiff states that, in fact, he did again express the need for his voir 
dire, but this was again rejected by the court. Thereafter, the trial court only asked 
additional questions requested by counsel for Anheuser-Busch, Mr. Christensen. R. 
40:18-44:15. At the end of those questions for Mr. Christensen, we find the second 
instance that Anheuser-Busch claims gave plaintiff an opportunity to reassert his voir 
dire, but did not: 
THE COURT: Thank you. All right. Anything else 
counsel before we move forward? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: No, Your Honor 
THE COURT: All right. Fine. 
R. 2223, 44:12-15. 
Defendant argues from the above that plaintiffs counsel was again silent 
when asked if there was "anything else." However, there was nothing else from plaintiff 
since his voir dire had already been rejected. The court would not and did not ask 
anything more requested by plaintiffs counsel. However, the real reason plaintiff did not 
respond was because the court was only addressing Mr. Christensen, since it had only 
asked Mr. Christensen's additional requested questions. Note that counsel for 
Prominence, Mr. Dalton, also did not respond to the court's question. 
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In any event, the "spin" which Anheuser-Busch attempts to put on the 
above dialogues and absence of dialogue is irrelevant, since the record does show that the 
trial court had the opportunity to rule on whether to give voir dire to elicit prospective 
jurors's exposure to tort reform propaganda and negative reports of negligence cases, and 
to question prospective jurors so as to discover their prejudices against personal injury 
cases. Indeed, the court was presented with controlling authority, and urged, in the 
strongest of language, to follow the law and properly voir dire the panel. Unfortunately, 
the court was persuaded by defense counsel not to do so. 
Alcazar is controlling in the matter at bar. The voir dire rejected by the trial 
court in Alcazar is nearly identical to the voir dire rejected by the trial court in the matter 
at bar. See RR. 1740-1742 and Alcazar f 4. As noted by the court in Alcazar, this voir 
dire was "'no less neutral or general than the preliminary questions required under the 
voir dire framework outlined in Evans.'" Alcazar at <J[ 14. The court stated, "The trial 
court simply left Plaintiffs' counsel without the necessary information needed to ferret out 
a potential juror's actual bias or to intelligently exercise peremptory challenges, thus 
prejudicing Plaintiffs." Id. at ^[18. The court then reversed the trial court's judgment and 
remanded for a new trial, holding that "the trial court's error was prejudicial because the 
trial court's refusal to ask Plaintiffs' counsel's voir dire questions or questions similar in 
nature substantially impaired his ability to challenge jurors for cause or to exercise his 
peremptory challenges." Id. at f 19. 
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As in Alcazar, in the matter at bar the trial court left plaintiff's counsel 
without the information needed to ferret out a potential juror's actual bias or to 
intelligently exercise peremptory challenges, thus prejudicing plaintiff's case. As in 
Alcazar, the court should reverse the trial court's judgment and remand for a new trial. 
POINT II 
THE DOCTRINE OF "PLAIN ERROR REVIEW" WOULD 
ALSO APPLY. 
Anheuser-Busch also argues that the "Plain Error Review" doctrine does 
not apply to the case at bar. Under that doctrine, the appellate court may reverse the 
lower court "on an issue not properly preserved for appeal", when a party can show (1) an 
error exists, (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and (3) the error is 
harmful, v/z., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome . Pratt, at^[ 16. 
While plaintiff has established that the issue of the trial court's voir dire 
error was preserved for appeal, plaintiff notes that the issue would, in any event, be 
reviewable under the plain error standard. First, the trial court erred, as set forth in Point 
I, above. Second, the error should have been obvious, especially given plaintiffs citation 
to authority, plaintiff's arguments, and the many and long-standing appellate court 
precedents supporting the voir dire requested by plaintiff. In Alcazar, the court reached 
its decision after noting its "prior, clear precedents." Alcazar at f 19. The court of 
appeals also reminded trial courts in Depew v. Sullivan, 2003 UT App. 152, 71 P.3d 601, 
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of the validity of the voir dire principles set forth in its prior holdings. Id. at ff 10-11. 
The court also cited holdings of the supreme court reminding trial judges of these same 
principles: 
The Utah Supreme Court has instructed "trial judges to take care to 
adequately and completely probe jurors on all possible issues of bias." 
State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 798 (Utah 1991). The purpose for this 
probing is to facilitate "both the detection of actual bias and the 
collection of data to permit informed exercise of the peremptory 
challenge." State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 447 (Utah 1983) (citations 
omitted). "All that is necessary for a voir dire question to be appropriate 
is that it allow f[a party] to exercise his peremptory challenges more 
intelligently.'" State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 845 (Utah 1988) 
(quoting State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 1060 (Utah 1984)). Accord 
Saunders, 1999 UT 59 at^[34. 
Depew, ztf 12. 
Anheuser-Busch argues that "[t]he trial court clearly believed it was within 
its broad discretion" in choosing not to inquire into prospective jurors' exposure to and 
biases from tort reform propaganda and negative reports of negligence cases. However, if 
that is truly what the trial court believed, then such belief was obviously erroneous, since, 
as set forth above, Utah appellate courts have reiterated that trial courts have little or no 
discretion when it comes to such inquiries. Depew v. Sullivan 2003 UT App. 152, 71 p. 
3d601,atff l l l , 12. 
Third, the error committed by the trial court was, per se, harmful, as 
previously held by this court. Rejecting the standard requirement that plaintiff show that 
an absence of error would have resulted in a different outcome, Barrett held that in the 
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context of voir dire questioning, prejudicial error is shown if the plaintiff's right to the 
informed exercise of peremptory challenges has been substantially impaired: 
An appellant claiming that the trial court's unreasonable limitation of 
voir dire substantially impaired his ability to exercise peremptory 
challenges simply cannot prove, in the traditional way, that prejudice 
resulted from the error. Appellant cannot show with any certainty that 
had certain questions been asked, particular responses would have been 
received; that certain jurors would then have been challenged for cause 
or peremptorily; and that particular, more favorably predisposed jurors 
would have been seated instead, who would have deliberated to a 
different result. Accordingly, in this context, we apply the test 
enunciated in Hornsby: Prejudicial error is shown if the appellant's 
right to the informed exercise of peremptory challenges has been 
,rsubstantially impaired." 758 P.2d at 933. 
Barrett at 103. (emphasis added). Similarly, in Depew, the court determined the failure 
to ask questions to elicit biases of prospective jurors was, of itself, prejudicial, and that no 
showing of "actual prejudice" was required since there was no way for the plaintiff to 
show any particular juror as biased or prejudiced. Depew, at H28-34. 
Plaintiff presented the court with the controlling authority regarding his 
requested voir dire, implored the trial court to follow the law, and warned of prejudicial 
error. While the trial court's error was preserved, the issue is reviewable, in any event, 
under the "Plain Error Review" doctrine. 
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POINT III 
THE INVITED ERROR DOCTRINE HAS NO APPLICATION. 
Anheuser-Busch next argues that plaintiff invited the trial court to commit error 
on voir dire and should be precluded from arguing the error on appeal. However, the invited 
error doctrine has no application in the matter at bar. The Utah Supreme Court explained, 
"Our invited error doctrine arises from the principle that a party cannot 
take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the 
trial court into committing the error." 
By precluding appellate review, "the doctrine furthers this principle by 
'discouraging parties from intentionally misleading the trial court so as 
to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal."' Further, parties 
are "not entitled to both the benefit of not objecting at trial and the 
benefit of objecting on appeal. Thus, "[e]ncouraging counsel to 
actively participate in all proceedings and to raise any possible error at 
the time of its occurrence fortifies our long-established policy that the 
trial court should have the first opportunity to address a claim of error." 
Pratt at f 17(citations omitted). The invited error doctrine usually requires an affirmative 
representation to the trial court by the accused party, that he has no objection to the matter 
at issue. Id. at f 18. 
Anheuser-Busch asserts that plaintiff affirmatively represented no objection 
to the trial court's voir dire and led the court into error by remaining "silent" when the 
court asked if the parties had any additional questions for the court to consider. However, 
as shown above, plaintiffs silence was no more than the court turning off the record. 
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Furthermore, even assuming plaintiff made no further voir dire requests, the court had 
only asked for "any additional questions", not ones that had already been rejected. 
In reality, rather than invite error, as quoted above, plaintiff notified the 
court of the controlling authority and plaintiffs absolute right to the voir dire. Plaintiff 
implored the court to give the voir dire and warned of prejudicial error if the court chose 
not to give it. Rather than plaintiff inviting error, defendants invited and persuaded the 
court to err by arguing the voir dire was inflammatory and a waste of time, and that the 
court could cover all the voir dire with one question crafted to its own liking. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY 
GRANTING THE CO-DEFENDANTS TWICE THE NUMBER 
OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES ALLOWED TO 
PLAINTIFF. 
The prejudice to plaintiff from the trial court's unwillingness to voir dire 
prospective jurors on tort reform and negligence case bias was compounded by the trial 
courts grant of six peremptory challenges to defendants. This, of itself, was prejudicial 
error under Utah Supreme Court precedent, which requires reversal of the trial court's 
judgment in the matter at bar and remand for a new trial. See, Carrier v. Pro-Tech 
Restoration, 944 P.2d 346 (Utah 1997), Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1993). 
The court made clear that peremptory challenges are a powerful tool to shape the jury and 
-18-
improper award of additional challenges to one side are unfairly prejudicial. Carrier at 
352. 
Anheuser-Busch argues that its third-party claim asserting comparative fault 
against Prominence and seeking reimbursement from Prominence of any damages 
awarded to plaintiff from Anheurser-Busch constituted a "substantial controversy", 
allowing the trial court discretion to award defendants additional peremptory challenges. 
As explained in plaintiff's principal brief, and reiterated below, the Utah Supreme Court 
made clear through Carrier and Randle that Anheuser-Busch's third-party action does not 
constitute a "substantial controversy" that would allow for additional peremptory 
challenges. 
However, as also pointed out in plaintiff s principal brief, there is a more 
obvious and ready basis for rejecting Anheuser-Busch's argument of "substantial 
controversy": At the start of trial, Anheuser-Busch and Prominence stipulated to drop all 
third-party claims from the lawsuit. R. 2223, 48:15-49:19, 51:11-54:9, RR. 2022-2028. 
In fact, after stipulating to dismissal of the third-party claims, defendants insisted that the 
court correct its initial statement to the jury panel that Anheuser-Busch was asserting that 
Prominence was at fault, and the court obliged. R. 2223,51:11-54:9, 64:7-18, 20:17-21:3. 
Anhesuer-Busch's dismissed third-party claims were not part of the trial in any way. Id., 
RR. 2022-2028. Anheuser-Busch has not shown and cannot show that it introduced any 
evidence or made a single argument that Prominence was at fault, in breach of contract, 
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or responsible to indemnify. None of these dismissed third-party claims were put on the 
jury verdict form. RR. 2022-2028. Defendants stipulated to dismiss the third-party 
claims so as to present a united defense asserting that plaintiff alone was at fault. 
Yet, when plaintiff renewed his objection to defendants' additional 
peremptory challenges, after defendants revealed to the court and plaintiff that they had 
settled all claims between them, the court maintained its initial ruling allowing defendants 
twice the number of peremptory challenges given to plaintiff. R. 2223, 44:21-48:14, 
115:13-116:16. 
Anheuser-Busch notes that even though the third-party claims of 
nelgigence, breach of contract, and indemnification had been dismissed, plaintiffs claim 
of negligence still existed against both Anheuser-Busch and Prominence. Anheuser-
Busch argues that a "substantial controversy" existed in that the jury still had to apportion 
fault between defendants on plaintiffs claim. However, Anhesuer-Busch' s argument is 
inapposite under Carrier and Randle. First, as demonstrated in plaintiffs principal brief, 
fault apportionment, even when co-defendants blame each other, does not create a 
"substantial controversy" that allows additional peremptory challenges. Carrier at 351, 
Randle at 1333. Both Carrier and Randle limit a "substantial controversy" to a cross-
claim against a co-party: 
To avoid favoring one side of a lawsuit over another, a trial Judge 
must carefully appraise the degree of adverseness among co-parties 
and determine whether that adverseness truly warrants giving that 
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side more challenges than the other. In our view, a "substantial 
controversy" exists when a party on one side of a lawsuit has a cross-
claim against a co-party that constitutes, in effect, a separate, distinct 
lawsuit from the action existing between the plaintiffs and 
defendants. When, however, a cross claim is merely derivative of 
the original action, such as a cross-claim for indemnification or 
contribution, a "substantial controversy" does not exist for the 
purposes of Rule 47. 
Randle at 1333, Carrier at 351-52. 
In Randle, Randle, individually and on behalf of his children, sued Allen, 
UDOT, and Salt Lake County for the wrongful death of his wife from a truck/car 
collision. Randle at 1333. Allen cross-claimed against his co-defendants, UDOT and 
Salt Lake County, for Allen's own injuries and damages from the collision. Id. The 
supreme court held that it was prejudicial error to grant UDOT and Salt Lake County 
separate peremptory challenges since they cross-claimed against each other and Allen 
"only for the purpose of indemnification or contribution in the event they should be found 
negligent." Id. However, the court noted that separate peremptory challenges for Allen 
was appropriate, since his cross-claim for his own personal injuries against UDOT and 
Salt Lake County constituted a "separate, distinct lawsuit from the action existing 
between the plaintiffs and defendants. Id. 
Anheuser-Busch and Prominence had no distinct, separate cross-claim, nor 
any cross-claim at all. However, Anheuser-Busch attempts to distinguish Carrier and 
Randle by arguing they did not involve "circumstances in which a non-derivative third-
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party complaint was filed to bring a third-party defendant into a lawsuit." This argument 
is without merit. First, as noted above, Anheuser-Busch dismissed its third-party 
complaint before the start of trial. Second, even had Anheuser-Busch not dismissed its 
action, it did not file a "non-derivative third-party complaint." Indeed, "non-derivative 
third-party complaint" is an oxymoron. Third-party complaints are, by nature and 
definition, derivative of the initial suit filed. As set forth in Rule 14, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 
(a) When defendant may bring in third party. At any time after 
commencement of the action a defendant, as a third-party plaintiff, may 
cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a party 
to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the 
plaintiffs claim against him. 
Rule 14, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Anheuser-Busch's filing of its "Third-Party Complaint" was precisely the 
derivative procedure set forth under Rule 14 for asserting a claim against another "who is 
or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff s claim against him." After plaintiff 
filed suit against Anheuser-Busch, Anheuser-Busch then moved the trial court for leave to 
file a third-party action against Prominence on the ground that Prominence was liable to 
Anheuser-Busch for part or all of plaintiffs claims against Anheuser-Busch. RR. 13-19. 
The motion was granted and Anheuser-Busch filed its "Third-Party Complaint". RR. 39-
46. In its third-party complaint, Anheuser-Busch asserted that (1) Prominence was 
comparatively at fault for plaintiffs injuries, (2) Prominence owed Anheuser-Busch 
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indemnification for any damages awarded Plaintiff against Anheuser-Busch, and (3) 
Prominence owed Anheuser-Busch for any damages awarded to Plaintiff against 
Anheuser-Busch as a result of Prominence's breach of contract to provide professional 
management of the Bud World Party and to provide liability insurance coverage for 
Anheuser-Busch. Id. 40-46. Of course, all this was subsequently dismissed before the 
start of trial, so there was no lawsuit between Anheuser-Busch and Prominence, let alone 
a "separate, distinct lawsuit." 
Nevertheless, Anheuser-Busch asserts a future, non-derivative breach of 
contract claim against Prominence depending on the outcome of the case at bar. If 
plaintiff understands correctly, Anheuser Busch argues that a substantial controversy 
existed between it and Prominence in that Anheuser-Busch had an interest in showing 
Prominence at fault for plaintiffs injuries, since that would improve a future lawsuit 
against Prominence for breach of contract. This argument is both irrelevant and specious. 
First, as described above and in plaintiff's principal brief, Carrier and 
Randle look at whether there is a substantial controversy to be tried in the case then 
before the court, not a theoretical future controversy. Second, even had Anheuser-Busch 
any interest in making Prominence appear at fault for a future purpose, fault shifting does 
not constitute a "substantial controversy" that would allow the trial court discretion to 
award additional peremptory challenges. Carrier at 351, Randle at 1333. Third, plaintiff 
notes that if Anheuser-Busch were positioning for damages in a future breach of contract 
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claim against Prominence, then its interest would be in making itself appear at fault and 
having damages awarded against it, rather than against Prominence. Damages awarded to 
plaintiff against Prominence would not be recoverable by Anheuser-Busch in a later 
breach of contract action. Fourth, plaintiff notes again that Anheuser-Busch and 
Prominence had dismissed their third-party action and their only defense at trial was that 
plaintiff was at fault for his own injuries. 
Finally, Georgia Ports Authority v. Harris, 243 Ga.App. 508, 533 S.E.2d 
404 (Ga.App. 2000) is irrelevant to the matter at bar. There, defendant Georgia Ports 
Authority appealed the equal allocation of defense peremptory challenges between it and 
plaintiff's employer, a third-party defendant. Id. at 512. Based on Georgia statutory law 
and facts unique to the case, the court found no abuse of discretion in the way the 
peremptory challenges were allocated between the defendants. Id. 
The record establishes, incontrovertibly, that there was no "substantial 
controversy" between the co-defendants, as that term has been defined by the Utah 
Supreme Court, that would allow the trial court to grant separate sets of peremptory 
challenges to the defendants. The trial court committed prejudicial error by giving 
defendants twice the number of peremptory challenges given to plaintiff. For this 
independent reason, the court should reverse the judgement of the trial court and remand 
for a new trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
The court should reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case 
for a new trial, since the trial court committed prejudicial errors in rejecting plaintiffs 
voir dire, requested to discover prospective juror exposure to negative reports of personal 
injury cases and prejudice against such cases. The trial court also committed prejudicial 
error in granting co-defendants six peremptory challenges, although there was no 
"substantial controversy" that would allow the trial court to allocate additional challenges. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff Michael Bee respectfully requests that the Utah 
Court of Appeals reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new 
trial. 
DATED AND SUBMITTED this 29th day of August, 2008. 
Matthew H. Raty 
Cory B Mattson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
Addendum 1: Plaintiffs Requested Voir Dire Nos. 1-4. RR. 1740-1744. 
Tabl 
Question No. 1. Do you believe a lawsuit is a proper 
method of resolving disputes concerning compensation for personal 
injuries? Ostler v. Albina Transfer Company, Inc., 781 P.2d 445 
(Utah 1989). Please explain [in chambers]. 
Question No. 2. Have any of you watched, read, or heard 
anything that suggests a "lawsuit crisis" or the need for ,ftort 
reform"? Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 101 (Utah App. 1993); 
Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991). Please explain [in 
chambers]. 
a. Do you think the article, program, etc. made some 
good points? 
b. Did you agree with the points made? Please explain 
[in chambers]. 
c. Would you be inclined to reduce the damage award, if 
any, in this case, because of what you have watched, 
read or heard? Please explain [in chambers]. 
Question No. 3. Have any of you watched, read or heard 
anything which suggests that jury verdicts are too high or 
unreasonable? What have you seen, heard or read? (To be asked of 
jurors in chambers.) 
a. Do you personally believe that jury verdicts are 
unreasonable? 
b. Do you believe that monetary limits should be placed 
upon the amounts which a jury can award to an 
individual who sues for personal injuries? 
Question No. 4. Would you be hesitant to award 
compensation for any of the following elements of damages, 
provided you first find that the plaintiff sustained his burden of proof 
to be entitled to damages: 
a. Past medical expenses? 
b. Past lost wages? 
c. Pain and suffering, including loss of enjoyment of life? 
d. Punitive damages to punish a wrong-doer? 
RR. 1740-1742. 
